Iran has always been a country with a dynamic agenda. Throughout the first half of 2024, events kept Iran constantly in the global spotlight. On May 19, 2024, the country lost its President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister in a helicopter crash that carried them and their delegation. The Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts elections had just taken place, and a new speaker for the assembly had yet to be chosen, plunging Iran back into an election cycle. To avoid showing the state in a weakened position, the establishment quickly announced the election schedule following a rapid decision-making process. Ebrahim Raisi had been a heavily invested figure by the establishment, with electoral engineering paving his way in every election he entered. His loss, coupled with the short time before the next election, raised many questions about who the new candidates would be, how voter turnout would fare, and what kind of politics Iran would pursue in the new term.
At the start of the process, Ali Larijani, a key figure in Iranian politics whose candidacy had been vetoed in the past, posted messages that sparked speculation about whether he had received approval from the Supreme Leader. This led to curiosity about whether his candidacy would be approved this time. Similarly, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced his candidacy to maintain his visibility. However, none of these figures were approved by the Guardian Council. Of the approved candidates, five belonged to the conservative camp, while one was from the reformist camp. Once the candidates were finalized, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of the Parliament and a significant figure in Iranian politics, emerged as the most prominent candidate according to many analysts. Saeed Jalili was another important figure from the conservative camp. However, it was believed that Jalili would withdraw in favor of Ghalibaf just before the elections to avoid splitting the conservative vote. Indeed, Jalili faced pressure to withdraw before the election, but he ignored these pressures and insisted on participating.
Masoud Pezeshkian stood out as a clean figure with public support. Additionally, reformists felt marginalized from the system since the 2020 parliamentary elections and were in a state of despair. After all this time, the approval of a figure like Pezeshkian brought a wave of hope among the reformist camp. Meanwhile, in the parliamentary elections held just before the presidential elections, Pezeshkian's candidacy was initially rejected and later accepted upon appeals. Pezeshkian also ran in the 2013 presidential election but withdrew in favor of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In the 2021 presidential election, where Ebrahim Raisi was elected, Pezeshkian's candidacy was vetoed by the Guardian Council. Therefore, the approval of Pezeshkian's candidacy was surprising to many, both for his reformist identity and for being vetoed in the last two elections (2021 presidential and 2024 parliamentary elections).
In the first round of the 2024 presidential election, no candidate received more than 50% of the votes, leading to a runoff. Reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian received 10.4 million votes (42.45%), placing him first, while ultraconservative candidate Saeed Jalili came in second with 9.5 million votes (38.61%). Among the other candidates, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf received 3.4 million votes (13.79%), and Mostafa Pourmohammadi received 206,000 votes (0.84%). A total of 1,056,159 invalid votes were counted.
The first round of the election was interesting in several aspects. Despite an initial wave of excitement during the candidacy process, this did not translate to the polls, resulting in the lowest voter turnout in Iran's history. Another interesting point was Ghalibaf's vote share. Although seen as the favorite, Ghalibaf's lack of popular support, contrasting with his significant support among conservative elites, was evident. This outcome severely damaged Ghalibaf's political career, given that he had significant backing from the system during a time when the tide was heavily in favor of conservatives. His alleged corruption charges might have also influenced this result.
Saeed Jalili's vote share was another highlight of the first round. Jalili, known for his uncompromising political stance and ultraconservative views, is a war veteran who lost his leg in the Iran-Iraq War. As a former Chief Nuclear Negotiator of Iran with a significant background in foreign policy, Jalili garnered more conservative support than Ghalibaf, which became evident through the election results. It also clarified why Jalili did not heed the pressures to withdraw.
Masoud Pezeshkian's first-place finish was significant, albeit not entirely surprising. In Iran, elections typically see higher participation from the conservative population. The reformist-supporting populace, demotivated, often refrains from voting, with some parts of the population having lost interest in elections altogether. Election results indicated that Pezeshkian received votes from conservatives as well. His tenure as Minister of Health and the healthcare investments in rural areas likely played a role in this support. Additionally, Pezeshkian has a compelling personal story, having lost his wife and one child in a 1994 accident and raising his remaining children alone, and actively participating in the Iran-Iraq War alongside his spouse. His clean track record and lack of corruption allegations also contributed to his success.
During the week between the first and second rounds of the elections, the Iranian press predominantly focused on voter turnout. Both the Supreme Leader's statements and media coverage emphasized that the 60% of the population who did not vote should not be perceived as "anti-revolutionary." Reformist newspapers attributed the low turnout to past election engineering practices. Eventually, the election day arrived, and Masoud Pezeshkian won with 16,384,403 votes (54.76%), becoming Iran's new president. Saeed Jalili received 13,538,179 votes (45.24%). Voter turnout was higher in the second round compared to the first, with approximately 49% participation.
Pezeshkian is known for his moderate and inclusive political approach. Figures like Javad Zarif and many from the Hassan Rouhani era are among his associates. This led the conservative-leaning media to refer to him as "The Third Rouhani Government" during the election campaign. Time will tell how much Zarif's foreign policy approach will influence Pezeshkian's administration. However, accusations from his rivals of "Pan-Turkism" and separatism might make Pezeshkian cautious in his dealings with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Given his political history, it is likely that he will dismiss such attacks with his consistent rhetoric of "Islam and unity." Finally, it remains to be seen who will receive votes of confidence from the still conservative-controlled Islamic Consultative Assembly for Pezeshkian's cabinet, and it is premature to make definitive statements without observing the first hundred days of his administration.
This article was first published on TAV on July 9, 2024.
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