Iran overlooks the PKK to counter Türkiye, leveraging regional influence while balancing internal security concerns
Iran-PKK relations date back to the late 1980s. Türkiye has expressed serious concerns about these relations, which intensified particularly in the 1990s and has warned Iran numerous times. During those years, multiple headlines and analyses were published about Iran's support for the PKK. Turkish authorities presented Iranian officials with extensive evidence of Iran's support for the PKK, but the Iranians denied all documentation.
In 1997, Türkiye launched a comprehensive cross-border operation against the organization, during which a Turkish helicopter was shot down. Then-Secretary General of General Staff Erol Özkasnak announced that two helicopters were hit by Russian-made SA-7B missiles fired by the PKK, with the missiles being sourced from Armenia and transported to the region through Iran. The day after this announcement, newspapers cited a report by Turkish intelligence units claiming: "The PKK has been establishing bases along the Türkiye-Iran border for five years. Iranian helicopters are transporting wounded PKK militants to hospitals in Iran." When Türkiye began to issue threats of war, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Alaeddin Boroujerdi visited Ankara on July 9-10, 1997, to deliver President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's message, aiming to reassure Ankara and explain that Iran was not supporting the PKK, contrary to Ankara's claims.
Entering the 2000s, Türkiye-Iran relations thawed and PKK-Iran relations fell off the agenda. However, with the Syrian civil war, this situation began to change and Iran started strengthening its ties with the PKK's Syrian wing YPG again. These relations eventually evolved into a strategic partnership. Bashar Assad's regime made way for the YPG, the PKK's Syrian branch backed by Western powers, and moved to share power with the YPG. As PKK/YPG began governing eastern Syria, Iran-PKK relations evolved to another level.
Different perspective
Last year, Defense Minister Yaşar Güler, in a news conference on May 2, criticized Iran's stance toward the PKK, stating: "We talk to our Iranian friends: 'Look, brother, they crossed from this point, they went there, we're tracking them. We can see from UAVs and armed UAVs.' Our Iranian friends respond: 'We looked there and there is no one.' This isn't a pleasant approach. Of course, we're disturbed." The minister's public statement reminds us of the 1990s.
So why does Iran maintain extensive relations with the PKK despite facing its own separatist threats? One would expect a country suffering from terrorism and dealing with separatist movements, like Türkiye, to take a similar position and approach events accordingly. However, there are other reasons behind Iran's attitude.
First, Iran and Türkiye's approaches to terrorist organizations stem from fundamental differences in their state structures and priorities. Türkiye, by its nature, must be trade-oriented and pursue a policy that values integration with the international system. Therefore, stability in its neighbors is of strategic importance for Ankara. For the same reason, Türkiye prefers to see strong central governments rather than non-state actors. Even when a non-state actor has become entrenched within a state, Türkiye wants to know that actor somehow integrated into the central government and minimized fragmentation within the country.
Iran adopts a more isolated and security-focused approach. Above all, it relies on its energy resources and geopolitical importance. Iran has legitimized relations with non-state actors at the constitutional level and prepared legal grounds for such groups under the principle of "standing with the oppressed." Iran's relationship with non-state actors is part of a systematic strategy dating back to the revolution. It tries to legitimize its presence in the region and the world through this strategy. It attempts to increase its presence in the Middle East and Muslim countries by claiming to stand against Israel and in Africa and South America by claiming to stand against imperialism. It identifies the needs of these organizations and states, prepares offers accordingly and tries to strengthen and control its relations with these non-state organizations. Thus, it gains instruments through which it can influence other countries and the region.
Therefore, while Iran sees benefiting from fragmentation as a strategic issue, Türkiye wants to see stable administrations with strong central governments. This reveals the difference in their perspectives.
PKK as an apparatus
Iran has a similar view regarding relations with the PKK, as it lacks an apparatus that can directly influence Turkish territory. Some associations and foundations affiliated with Iran cannot go beyond propaganda activities and their management is carried out by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC) affiliated brigades. The PKK, however, as an organization that has been in active armed conflict with Türkiye for many years, holds special importance for Iran. Iran tries to pressure Türkiye by giving the PKK freedom of movement within its borders, in Sulaymaniyah, where its influence is high, and on the Iranian side of Qandil. Through this, it aims to turn regional balances in its favor and maintain strong leverage against Türkiye and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq. In other words, through the PKK, Iran tries to pressure the KDP and create space for itself in regional competition by preventing Türkiye's regional strategies. By disregarding their activities, it aims to mitigate the impact of sanctions and support the organization by allowing it to secure its own financing.
In return for all this support, the PKK and its Iranian wing PJAK do not conduct any activities within Iran and suppress other separatist Kurdish groups against the state of Iran. In fact, during the Mahsa Amini protests, the PJAK announced that Iran should not be divided, declaring this to be a plan of the imperialists. Thus, Iran secures its internal security through this support. In Syria (especially before the regime change), the PKK/YPG provided Iran with logistical facilities. It supported Iran in the logistical lines that allowed Iran to reach Latakia and Beirut.
After the regime change in Syria, Iran lost a significant area. This angered Iranian elites so much that analysts on television began openly advocating for an alliance with the PKK against Türkiye. Similarly, in addition to the heavy blows received by Iran's proxy forces in the past year, the regime change in Syria has made the PKK/YPG more important in Iran's view. Iran is pursuing cooperation with the PKK/YPG to increase its influence in Syria. Indeed, recent reports emerged about Iran attempting to supply weapons and drones to the PKK/YPG. Iran, trying to make deliveries to the organization through Tal Tamr and Tishrin, has failed multiple times due to accurate strikes by Turkish artillery.
On the other hand, following Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s suspicious death and the assassination of Hamas' head, Ismail Haniyeh, Iran has shifted its focus to internal vulnerabilities and is now more concerned with potential security issues on its domestic front than with regional policies. Türkiye, as an important neighbor of Iran, holds strategic importance in many areas. Therefore, it can be said that Iran will continue its relations with the PKK/YPG at a level that won't directly confront Türkiye but without completely cutting them off.
This article was first published in Daily Sabah newspaper on 31.01.2025
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